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Abstract
In this paper we establish hierarchic control for the linear heat equation in RN with potentials.
Our strategy is inspired by the techniques developed by J.I. Dı´az and J.-L. Lions [2]; however
many new difficulties arise due to lack of compactness of Sobolev embeddings. We manage these
adversities by employing similarity variables and weighted Sobolev spaces.
1 Introduction and main result
Optimization problems appear quite often in a number of problems from engineering sciences and
economics. Many mathematical models are formulated in terms of optimization problems involving
a unique objective, minimize cost or maximize profit, etc... In more realistic and involved situations,
several (in general conflicting) objectives ought to be considered. In general for the classical mono-
objective control problem, a functional adding the objectives of the problem is defined and an unique
control is used. When it is not clear how to average the different objectives or when several controls
are used, it becomes essential to study multi-objective problems. The different notions of equilibrium
for multi-objective problems were introduced in economy and games theory (see [7, 8, 9]).
In this article, motivated by the arguments contained in the work of J.I. Dı´az and J.-L. Lions [2],
we investigate similar question of hierarchic control, employing the Stackelberg-Nash strategy for the
semilinear heat equation in an unbounded domain Ω ⊂ RN when the control acts on the interior of
Ω.
The general statement of the problem is as follows: Let O, O1, O2, ..., On be a bounded open and
disjoint nonempty subsets of Ω. Given a control time T > 0 and a potentials a(x, t) ∈ L∞(RN×(0, T ))
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and b(x, t) ∈ (L∞(RN × (0, T )))N , we consider the following semilinear heat equation:∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
ut −∆u+ a(x, t)u + b(x, t).∇u = fχO +
n∑
i=1
wiχOi in Q = Ω× (0, T ),
u = 0 on Σ = ∂Ω× (0, T ),
u(x, 0) = u0(x) in Ω,
(1.1)
where u0, f and wi are given functions in appropriate spaces, i = 1, 2, ..., n, and χO and χOi denote
the characteristic functions of the sets O and Oi, respectively. We will assume that u0 ∈ L2(RN ),
f ∈ L2(RN × (0, T )) and wi ∈ L2(RN × (0, T )), i = 1, ..., n.
The subset O ⊂ Ω is the control domain (which is supposed to be as small as desired), O1, O2,
..., On the secondary control domains, the function f is called leader control and wi, (i = 1, 2, ..., n),
the followers controls.
To avoid repetitions, throughout this paper, the index i will always vary from 1 to n.
Remark 1.1. In (1.1) it was assumed u(x, 0) = u0(x) = 0 in Ω. If u0 6= 0, the system can be
transformed into one equivalent but with u0 = 0. This is possible in consequence of linearity of the
system.
As the solution u of (1.1) depends on f, w1, ..., wn then we denote it by u = u(x, t, f,w), where
w = (w1, ..., wn), or sometimes by u = u(x, t, f, w1, ..., wn). We will study a control problem for (1.1)
in the case of f to be independent and w1, ..., wn depend on f . More explicitly, the control f does a
choice for its police and the choices of the polices of w1, ..., wn depend on that of f . For this reason
the control f is called the leader and w1, ..., wn the followers. This process of control is called by Lions
[5] a hierarchic control.
In order to localize the action of the controls wi, we introduce the functions ρ˜i(x), defined on Ω
with real values, satisfying:∣∣∣∣∣ ρ˜i ∈ L∞(RN ), ρ˜i ≥ 0,ρ˜i = 1 in Gi ⊂ Ω, where Gi is a region of where wi works. (1.2)
The objective is the controls f, w1, ..., wn work so that the state function u(x, t), solution of the
state equation (1.1), reaches, at the time T , an ideal state uT (x), with cost functionals defined by:
J˜i(f, w1, . . . , wn) =
1
2
∫ T
0
∫
Oi
w2i dxdt+
αi
2
∫
RN
∣∣ρ˜i[u(x, T, f,w)− uT ]∣∣2 dx, (1.3)
with w = (w1, ..., wn), αi > 0 constant.
We describe the methodology as follows: The followers w1, ..., wn suppose the leader did a choice
f for his police. Then, they try to find a Nash equilibrium for its costs J˜1, ..., J˜n , that is, they look
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for controls w1, ..., wn , depending on f , such that they minimize their costs. This means that they
look for w1, ..., wn , depending on f , satisfying:
J˜i(f, w1, . . . , wi, . . . , wn) ≤ J˜i(f, w1, . . . , wi, . . . , wn), ∀ wi ∈ L2(RN × (0, T )). (1.4)
The controls w1, ..., wn, solutions of the system of n inequalities (1.4), are called Nash equilibrium
for the costs J˜1, ..., J˜n and they depend on f (cf. Aubin [1]).
Remark 1.2. In another way, if the leader makes a choice f , then the follower makes also a choice
wi(f) which becomes minimum its cost J˜i, that is,
J˜i(f, w1, . . . , wi, . . . , wn) = inf
wi∈L2(RN×(0,T ))
J˜i(f, w1, . . . , wi, . . . , wn). (1.5)
This is equivalent to the inequalities (1.4). This process is called Stackelberg-Nash strategy, see
Dı´az and Lions [2].
The control problem that we will consider is as follows: to find controls w = (w1, ..., wn) and the
corresponding state u verifying (1.1) and the Nash equilibrium related to the functionals J˜i defined
in (1.3), subject to the following (approximate) controllability constraint
u(x, t, f,w) ∈ BL2(RN )(uT , α), (1.6)
where BL2(RN )(u
T , α) denote the ball of L2(RN ) with center in uT and ratio α > 0 (a given number),
i.e. if ∣∣∣∣∣∣ u(x, t, f,w) describes a dense subset of the given state spacewhen f spans the set of all controls available to the leader. (1.7)
Remark 1.3. We emphasize again that in (1.7) the controls wi are chosen so that (1.4) is satisfied.
Therefore they are functions of f .
To explain this optimal problem, we are going to consider the following two sub-problems:
• Problem 1 Fixed any leader control f , to find follower controls w1, ..., wn (depending on f) and
the associated state u solution of (1.1) satisfying the Nash equilibrium related to J˜i defined in (1.3).
• Problem 2 Assuming that the existence of the Nash equilibrium w1(f), ..., wn(f) was proved,
then when f varies in L2(RN × (0, T )), to prove that the solutions u(x, t, f, w1(f), ..., wn(f)) of the
state equation (1.1), evaluated at t = T , that is, u(x, T, f, w1(f), ..., wn(f)), generate a dense subset
of L2(RN ). This permits to approximate uT .
The problems 1 and 2 were proved by Dı´az and Lions [2] when Ω is a bounded set. The aim
of this paper is to adapt the techniques introduced in [2] to unbounded domains by introducing the
weighted Sobolev spaces of Escobedo and Kavian [4] that guarantee the compactness of the Sobolev’s
embeddings. Nevertheless, this proof is valid only when Ω = RN or a cone-like domain, since it is
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necessary to make a change of variables. For simplicity we limit ourselves to the case Ω = RN . Under
these conditions, the semilinear heat equation given in (1.1) reads as follows:∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
ut −∆u+ a(x, t)u + b(x, t).∇u = fχO +
n∑
i=1
wiχOi in R
N × (0, T ),
u(x, 0) = u0(x) = 0 in R
N .
(1.8)
The main result of this paper is the following:
Theorem 1.1. Suppose that f ∈ L2(RN×(0, T )) and there exists a unique Nash equilibrium w1, ..., wn,
depending on f , given by the inequalities (1.4).
Then, the set of solutions u (x, t, f,w(f)) of (1.8) evaluated at time t = T is dense in L2(RN ).
In order, to avoid the problems related to the noncompactness of the Sobolev’s embeddings in Rn,
we consider the operator
Lξ = −∆ξ − y∇ξ
2
= − 1
K
div(K∇ξ),
K(y) = exp
( |y|2
4
)
,
D(L) ⊂ L2(K) =
{
ξ : RN → R :
∫
RN
K(y)|ξ(y)|2dy <∞
}
,
and the evolution equation∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
vs + Lv +A(y, s)v +B(y, s).∇v − N
2
v = g(y, s)χO′ +
n∑
i=1
hi(y, s)χO′
i
in RN × (0, S),
v(y, 0) = v0(y) in R
N ,
(1.9)
with v0(y) ∈ L2(K), O′, O′i a suitable set in RN ; and S = log(T+1). A change of variables transforms
(1.8) in (1.9). In fact, if we define for s ≥ 0, y ∈ RN∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
v(y, s) = e
sN
2 u(e
s
2 y, es − 1)
A(y, s) = es a(e
s
2 y, es − 1)
B(y, s) = e
s
2 b(e
s
2 y, es − 1)
g(y, s) = e
s(N+2)
2 f
(
e
s
2 y, es − 1)
hi(s, y) = e
s(N+2)
2 wi
(
e
s
2 y, es − 1),
(1.10)
then, for u0 ∈ L2(K) and u solution of (1.8), v verifies (1.9) with v0 = u0, S = log(T + 1), O′(s) =
e−
s
2O, and O′i(s) = e−
s
2Oi.
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Reciprocally, if we know a solution v of (1.9), and we define for t ≥ 0, x ∈ RN∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
u(x, t) = (1 + t)
−N2 v(
x√
1 + t
, log(1 + t))
a(x, t) = (1 + t)
−1
A(
x√
1 + t
, log(1 + t))
b(x, t) = (1 + t)
− 12 B(
x√
1 + t
, log(1 + t))
f(x, t) = (1 + t)
−N2 −1 g(
x√
1 + t
, log(1 + t))
wi(x, t) = (1 + t)
−N2 −1 hi(
x√
1 + t
, log(1 + t)),
(1.11)
it is not difficult to see that u satisfies (1.8) with u0 = v0 and T = e
S − 1.
The change of variables is interesting because the operator L defined above has compact inverse
in L2(K) and then the equation (1.9) can be studied in the same manner as the heat equation in a
bounded region Ω of RN .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we introduce the similarity variables
and the weighted Sobolev spaces; we discuss some a priori estimates of the norm of the solution in
these spaces. In Section 3 we investigate the approximate controllability proving the density Theorem
1.1. Section 4 is concerned with the existence of the Nash equilibrium which is gotten by using
the Lax-Milgram Theorem. Finally, for completeness, in Section 5 we recall a result concerning the
existence and uniqueness of a solution to (1.1) and also similar results for this adjoint system.
2 Weighted Sobolev spaces
In this section we recall some basic facts about the similarity variables and weighted Sobolev
spaces for the heat equation. We refer to [4] for further developments and details.
We consider the solution u = u(x, t) of problem (1.8). We now introduce the new space-time
variables
y =
x√
t+ 1
; s = log(t+ 1). (2.1)
Then, given u = u(x, t) solution of (1.8) we introduce
v(y, s) = esN/2 u(es/2y, es − 1). (2.2)
It follows that u solves (1.8) if and only if v satisfies (1.9). In the sequel, we shall analyze the
approximate controllability of the system (1.9) similarly to Theorem 1.1.
The elliptic operator involved in (1.9) may also be written as
Lv = −∆v − y · ∇v
2
= − 1
K(y)
div(K(y)∇v) (2.3)
6 Controllability of Stackelberg-Nash Strategies for Linear Heat 2008
where K = K(y) is the Gaussian weight
K(y) = exp
(|y|2/4). (2.4)
We introduce the weighted Lp-spaces:
Lp(K) =
{
f : |f |Lp(K) =
[∫
RN
|f(y)|pK(y)dy
]1/p
<∞
}
.
For p = 2, L2(K) is a Hilbert space and the norm | · |L2(K) is induced by the inner product
(f, g) =
∫
RN
f(y) g(y) K(y) dy.
We then define the unbounded operator L on L2(K) by setting
Lv = −∆v − y · ∇v
2
,
as above, and D(L) = {v ∈ L2(K) : Lv ∈ L2(K)}.
Integrating by parts it is easy to see that∫
RN
(Lv)vK(y) dy =
∫
RN
|∇v|2K(y) dy.
Therefore it is natural to introduce the weighted H1-space:
H1(K) =
{
f ∈ L2(K) : ∂f
∂yi
∈ L2(K), i = 1, 2, . . . , N
}
endowed with the norm
|f |H1(K) =
[∫
RN
(|f |2 + |∇f |2)K(y) dy]1/2 .
In a similar way, for any s ∈ N we may introduce the space
Hs(K) = {f ∈ L2(K) : Dαf ∈ L2(K), ∀α, |α| ≤ s}.
The operator L defined above has compact inverse in L2(K) and the equation (1.9) can be studied
in the same manner as the heat equation in a bounded region Ω of RN .
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In fact, the following properties were proved in [4]:∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∫
RN
f2|y|2K(y) dy ≤ c
∫
RN
|∇f |2K(y) dy, ∀ f ∈ H1(K),
the embedding H1(K) →֒ L2(K) is compact,
∀f ∈ H1(K), N
2
∫
RN
K(y)|f |2dy ≤
∫
RN
K(y)|∇f |2dy,
v ∈ H1(K)⇔ K 12 v ∈ H1(RN ),
ϕ1 = exp
(−|y|2
4
)
is a eigenfunction of L corresponding to λ1 = N/2,
the minimum eigenvalue of L, i.e. Lϕ1 =
N
2
ϕ1
L : H1(K)→ (H1(K))−1 is an isomorphism,
D(L) = H2(K) and
L−1 : L2(K)→ L2(K) is self-adjoint and compact.
if N = 1, v ∈ H1(K), then K 12 v ∈ L∞(R),
if N = 2, H1(K) ⊂ Lq(K) ∀q ≥ 2, and q ≤ ∞,
if N = 3, H1(K) ⊂ L2∗(K) with 2∗ = 2N
N − 2 .
(2.5)
Remark 2.1. Moreover, we have L2(K) ⊂ L1(RN ) with continuous embedding. If v ∈ L2(K), then∫
RN
|v| dy =
∫
RN
1
K1/2
K1/2 |v| dy ≤
(∫
RN
K|v|2dy
) 1
2
(∫
RN
1
K
dy
) 1
2
<∞.
Given two separable Hilbert spaces V and H such that V ⊂ H with continuous embedding, V
being dense in H , let us consider the Hilbert space
W (0, T, V,H) = {ξ ∈ L2(0, T, V ) : ξt ∈ L2(0, T,H)}
equipped with the norm
|ξ|2W (0,T,V,H) = |ξ|2L2(0,T,V ) + |ξt|2L2(0,T,H)
see, for instance [6].
Let us recall some important and useful facts about the spaces appearing in this paper:∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
W (0, T,H1(K), H−1(K)) ⊂ L2(0, T, L2(K)) with compact imbedding;
W (0, T,H1(K), H−1(K)) ⊂ C([0, T ], L2(K)) with continuous imbedding;
W (0, T,H2(K), L2(K)) ⊂ L2(0, T,H1(K)) with compact imbedding;
W (0, T,H2(K), L2(K)) ⊂ C([0, T ], H1(K)) with continuous imbedding.
(2.6)
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The results of (2.5) to (2.6) allow us to prove that if g ∈ L2(0, S;L2(K)), hi ∈ L2(0, S;L2(K)) and
v0 ∈ L2(K), then system (1.9) admits a unique solution v ∈ W (0, S,H1(K), H−1(K)) (see Theorem
5.1).
We will consider the following objective functionals J1, ..., Jn defined by∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Ji : L
2(0, S;L2(K))→ R
Ji(g, h1, . . . , hi, . . . , hn)
=
1
2
∫ S
0
∫
O′
i
|Dy,s| h2i K(y) dyds+
αi
2
∫
RN
|Dy| ρi(y)2
∣∣v(y, S, g,h)− vS(y)∣∣2K(y) dy,
(2.7)
where vS(y) = (1 + T )
N
2 uT (x), with ρi(y) ≥ 0, ρi(y) = 1 in O′i, h = (h1, ..., hn), and Dy,s, Dy denote
the determinant of transformation (x, t) → (y, s) and x → y, respectively. We note that there exist
k1, k2, k3, k4 positive real constants such that∣∣∣∣∣∣ 0 < k1 < |Dy,s| < k2 for all (y, s),0 < k3 < |Dy| < k4 for all y. (2.8)
The Nash equilibrium for Ji are h1, ..., hn, which depend on g, solution of
Ji(g, h1, . . . , hi, . . . , hn) ≤ Ji(g, h1, . . . , hi, . . . , hn), ∀ hi ∈ L2(0, S;L2(K)). (2.9)
From the regularity and uniqueness of the solution v of (1.9) the cost functionals J1, ..., Jn are well
defined. Henceforth, as Ji is convex and lower semi-continuous, then h1, ..., hn is a Nash equilibrium
if, and only if, it verifies the Euler-Lagrange equation.
From the definition of Ji, we obtain
Ji
(
g, h1, . . . , hi + λĥi, . . . , hn
)
=
1
2
∫ S
0
∫
O′
i
|Dy,s|
(
hi + λĥi
)2
K(y) dyds
+
αi
2
∫
RN
|Dy| ρi(y)2
∣∣∣v(y, S, g, h1, ..., hi + λĥi, ..., hn)− vS(y)∣∣∣2K(y) dy (2.10)
Remark 2.2. As the state equation (1.9) is linear, for any choice of the controls g, hi, its unique
solution at the time s can be written as
v(s) = Q0(s)g +
n∑
i=1
Qi(s)hi, 0 ≤ s ≤ S, (2.11)
where Qi are linear continuous operators depending on the controls. At the time s = S one has
v(S) = L0g +
n∑
i=1
Lihi, (2.12)
where Li are also linear and continuous operators.
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Then, from (2.10) and Remark 2.2, we have
Ji
(
g, h1, . . . , hi + λĥi, . . . , hn
)
=
1
2
∫ S
0
∫
O′
i
|Dy,s|
(
hi + λĥi
)2
K(y) dyds
+
αi
2
∫
RN
|Dy| ρi(y)2
∣∣∣L0g + L1h1 + ...+ Li(hi + λĥi) + ...+ Lnhn)− vS(y)∣∣∣2K(y) dy. (2.13)
The derivative with respect to λ, evaluated at λ = 0, is the Gateaux derivative given by
d
dλ
Ji
(
g, h1, . . . , hi + λĥi, . . . , hn
) ∣∣∣∣∣
λ=0
=
1
2
∫ S
0
∫
O′
i
|Dy,s|hiĥiK(y) dyds
+
αi
2
∫
RN
|Dy| ρi(y)2[v(y, S, g,h)− vS(y)] Liĥi K(y)dy,
(2.14)
for all ĥi in L
2(0, S;L2(K)), where h = (h1, ..., hn) and Liĥi = v̂i(y, S; ĥi) (cf. Remark 2.2), with
v̂i(y, s; ĥi) solution of∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂v̂i
∂s
+ Lv̂i +A(y, s)v̂i +B(y, s) . ∇v̂i − N
2
v̂i = ĥiχO′
i
in RN × (0, S),
v̂i(0) = 0 in R
N .
(2.15)
Therefore, h1, ..., hn is a Nash equilibrium for the cost functionals J1, ..., Jn if, and only if, it verifies
the Euler-Lagrange equation
J ′i(g, h1, . . . , hi, . . . , hn).ĥi = 0, for all ĥi ∈ L2(0, S;L2(K)). (2.16)
Explicitly we have∫ S
0
∫
O′
i
|Dy,s| hiĥiK(y) dyds+ αi
∫
RN
|Dy| ρ2i (y)[v(y, S, g,h)− vS(y)] v̂i K(y)dy = 0, (2.17)
for all ĥi ∈ L2(0, S;L2(K)) and v̂i(y, s; ĥi) solution of (2.15).
Note that if h1, ..., hn is the unique Nash equilibrium, depending on g, for (2.7), then its transfor-
mation, by the (1.11), is the unique Nash equilibrium w1, ..., wn for (1.3), which depends on f .
We recall that our initial problem was the controls f , w1, . . ., wn work such that the function
u(x, t), unique solution of (1.8), reaches a fixed state uT (x) ∈ L2(RN ), at time T , with cost functionals
defined by (1.3).
From the change of variables (1.10), this problem in RN×(0, T ) was transformed into one equivalent
(1.9) in some weighted Sobolev space. Thus, for fixed vS(y) ∈ L2(K) the controls g, h1, ..., hn must
work such that the unique solution v(y, s, g,h(g)) of (1.9), evaluated at s = S, reaches the ideal state
vS(y). This will be done in the sense of an approximate controllability. In fact, it is sufficient to
prove if h1, ..., hn, depending of g, is the unique Nash equilibrium for the cost functionals (2.7), then
we have an approximate controllability. This means that if there exists the Nash equilibrium and
v(y, s; g,h(g)) is the unique solution of (1.9), then the set generated by v(y, S; g,h(g)) is dense in
L2(K), that is, approximate vS(y). This will be proven in the next section.
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3 Approximate controllability
This section is devoted to proving the main result, namely, Theorem 1.1. For this, initially we
obtain the following result on the ”approximate controllability” for the system (1.9):
Theorem 3.1. Suppose g ∈ L2(0, S;L2(K)) and there exists a unique Nash equilibrium h1(g), ..., hn(g),
depending on g, given by the inequalities (2.9). Then, the set of solutions v(y, s; g,h(g)) of (1.9) eval-
uated at time s = S in dense in L2(K).
Proof. It will be done in two steps. First, we find the adjoint state and the optimality system. In
the second one we prove the approximate controllability by means of a simple argument of functional
analysis and results of unique continuation.
The application of this method requires only the unique continuation property due to C. Fabre [3]
(Theorem 1.4 of [3]). More precisely, we have:
Proposition 3.1. Let w be an open and nonempty set of RN , ωˆ(s) = e−s/2w and qˆ = {(y, s); s ∈
(0, S), y ∈ ωˆ(s)}. Assume that A(y, s) ∈ L∞(RN × (0, S)), B(y, s) ∈ (L∞(RN × (0, S)))N . Let
p ∈ L2(0, S;H1(K)) be such that∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
− ps + Lp+Ap− div(Bp)− N
2
p− 1
2
y · Bp = 0 in RN × (0, S)
p = 0 in qˆ.
Then p ≡ 0.
Proof of Proposition 3.1 L, A and B do satisfy the conditions of Theorem 1.4 due C. Fabre [3]
and the assumption on p implies p ∈ L2loc(0, S,H1loc(RN )). Consequently p ≡ 0.
Step 1. Suppose there exists the Nash equilibrium h1, ..., hn depending on g for the cost functionals
J1, ..., Jn defined in (2.7). Thus, it implies this is a solution of the Euler-Lagrange equation (2.17),
conditioned to the system of linear parabolic equations (2.15).
In order to express (2.17) in a convenient form, we introduce the adjoint state pi defined by∣∣∣∣∣∣ −p
′
i + Lpi +Api − div (Bpi)−
N
2
pi − 1
2
y . Bpi = 0 in R
N × (0, S),
pi(y, S) = |Dy| ρ2i (y)
[
v(y, S; g,h)− vS(y)] in RN . (3.1)
At the end of this paper, we recall without proof a (relatively well known) result concerning
the adjoint system (3.1). Under natural hypotheses on A(y, s) and B(y, s), we see there that, for
each p(y, s) ∈ H−1(K), there exists exactly one solution pi to (3.1), with pi ∈ L2(0, S;L2(K)) ∩
C
(
[0, S];H−1(K)
)
; see Theorem 5.2.
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If we multiply (3.1) by K(y)v̂ and if we integrate by parts, we find∫
RN
|Dy| ρ2i (y)
(
v(y, S; g,h)− vS(y)) v̂i(S) K(y) dy = ∫ S
0
∫
RN
pi ĥi χO′
i
K(y) dyds (3.2)
so that (2.17) becomes ∫ S
0
∫
O′
i
(|Dy,s| hi + αipi) ĥi K(y) dyds = 0, (3.3)
for all ĥi ∈ L2(0, S;L2(K)). Then |Dy,s| hi + αipi = 0 in O′i × (0, S). By hypothesis, we obtain
hi = − αipi|Dy,s| in O
′
i × (0, S). (3.4)
Thus, if h1, ..., hn is the unique Nash equilibrium for the cost functionals J1, ..., Jn , which is
associated with the state equation (1.9), then we get the optimality system∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂v
∂s
+ Lv +Av +B . ∇v − N
2
v +
n∑
i=1
αipi
|Dy,s| χO
′
i
= gχO′ in R
N × (0, S),
−p′i + Lpi +Api − div (Bpi)−
N
2
pi − 1
2
y . Bpi = 0 in R
N × (0, S),
v(0) = 0, pi(y, S) = |Dy| ρ2i (y)
[
v(y, S; g,h)− vS(y)] in RN .
(3.5)
We recall that here we are assuming the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium . We
return to that in Section 4.
Step 2. To prove approximate controllability we assume vS(y) = 0 to simplify the calculus, because
the optimality system (3.5) is linear (it suffices to use a translation argument).
Let ζ ∈ L2(K) and let us assume that
(v(., S; g,h(g)), ζ)L2(K) = 0, (3.6)
for all g ∈ L2(0, S;L2(K)). We want to show that ζ ≡ 0.
Motivated by (3.5), since we suppose vS(y) = 0, we introduce the solution {ϕ, ψ1, ψ2, . . . , ψn} of
the adjoint system∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−∂ϕ
∂s
+ Lϕ+ Aϕ− div (Bϕ) − N
2
ϕ− 1
2
y . Bϕ = 0 in RN × (0, S),
∂ψi
∂s
+ Lψi +Aψi +B . ∇ψi − N
2
ψi = − 1|Dy,s|αiϕ χO
′
i
in RN × (0, S),
ϕ(S) = ζ +
n∑
i=1
|Dy| ψi(S) ρ2i in RN ,
ψi(0) = 0 in R
N .
(3.7)
Multiplying (3.7)1 by K(y)v and (3.7)2 by K(y)pi and integrating in R
N × (0, S) we obtain
− (ζ +∑ni=1 |Dy| ψi(S)ρ2i , v(S))L2(K)
+
∫ S
0
∫
RN
ϕ
(∂v
∂s
+ Lv +Av +B . ∇v − N
2
v
)
K(y) dyds = 0,
(3.8)
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and
n∑
i=1
(ψi(S), pi(S))L2(K) +
∫ S
0
∫
RN
n∑
i=1
1
|Dy,s|αiϕpi K(y) χO
′
i
dyds = 0. (3.9)
From the identity (3.8) and (3.9) and using (3.7), we have
− (ζ, v(S))L2(K) +
∫ S
0
∫
RN
ϕ g K(y) χO′ dyds = 0, for all g ∈ L2(0, S;L2(K)). (3.10)
Therefore, if (3.6) holds, this equality implies that∫ S
0
∫
O′
ϕ g K(y) dyds = 0, for all g ∈ L2(0, S;L2(K)). (3.11)
It follows by the unique continuation, cf. C. Fabre [3], that ϕ = 0 on RN × (0, S). Going back to
(3.7), the initial-boundary value for ψi implies ψi = 0 in R
N × (0, S) and from the continuity, so that
(3.7)3 gives ζ = 0. This ends the proof of Theorem 3.1.
We conclude this section with the proof of Theorem 1.1, as an immediate consequence of Theorem
3.1.
Proof of Theorem 1.1 Let us assume that f ∈ L2(RN × (0, T )) and there exists a unique Nash
equilibrium w = (w1, ..., wn), depending on f , given by the inequalities (1.4). We need to show that
the set of solutions u(x, t, f,w) of (1.8) evaluated at time t = T is dense in L2(RN ), that is, for any
u0, u
T ∈ L2(RN ), f ∈ L2(RN × (0, T )) and ǫ > 0, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium w = w(f)
such that the solution u of (1.8) satisfies
|u(T )− uT |L2(RN ) ≤ ǫ. (3.12)
Remark 3.1. We recall that, if we know a unique Nash equilibrium h = (h1, ..., hn), depending on g,
for (2.7), then its transformation, by the change of variables (1.11), is the unique Nash equilibrium
w = (w1, ..., wn) for (1.3), which depends on f .
We postpone the proof of the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium h = (h1, ..., hn) for
(2.7), however, to Section 4. For the moment, let us assume that these properties hold.
Our plan to prove Theorem 1.1 is divided into two steps.
• First step: The case uT ∈ L2(K).
We make the change of variables vS(y) = (T +1)
N
2 uT ((T +1)
1
2 y) and S = log(T +1). We have that
vS ∈ L2(K) and v0 = u0 = 0 ∈ L2(K). From Theorem 3.1 and Remark 3.1 we know the existence of a
unique Nash equilibrium h = (h1, ..., hn) for (2.7) such that the solution v(y, s, g,h) of (1.9) satisfies:
|v(S)− vS |L2(K) ≤ ǫ. (3.13)
Therefore
u(x, t) = (1 + t)−
N
2 v
(
x√
1 + t
, log(1 + t)
)
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satisfies (1.8) with ∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
f(x, t) = (1 + t)
−N2 −1 g(
x√
1 + t
, log(1 + t))
wi(x, t) = (1 + t)
−N2 −1 hi(
x√
1 + t
, log(1 + t)),
and
|u(T )− uT |2L2(RN ) ≤
∫
RN
(1 + T )−N e|x|
2
/
4(1+T )
∣∣∣∣v( x√1 + T , S
)
− vS
(
x√
1 + T
)∣∣∣∣2 dx
≤
∫
RN
K(1 + T )−N/2|v(y, S)− vS(y)|2 dy ≤ (1 + T )−N/2|v(S)− vS |2L2(K) ≤ ε2.
Second step: uT ∈ L2(RN ).
Since L2(K) ⊂ L2(RN ) with dense inclusion, there exists a sequence {uTn} ⊂ L2(K) such that
uTn → uT strongly in L2(RN ). From the first step, we know the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium
wn such that u(x, t, f,wn) the solution of (1.8) with w = wn satisfies
|u(T )− uTn |L2(RN ) ≤
ǫ
2
.
Let N˜ be such that for every n > N˜ ,
|uT − uTn |L2(RN ) ≤
ǫ
2
.
Then u(x, t, f,wN˜ ) the solution of (1.8) with w = wN˜ satisfies
|u(T )− uT |L2(RN ) ≤ ǫ.
This completes the proof of Theorem 1.1.

4 Existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium
Let us consider the cost functionals Ji defined by (2.7) corresponding to the state equation (1.9).
Firstly, we are going to rewrite the system (2.17). For this, we consider the following functional spaces∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Hi = L2(0, S;L2(K)),
H =
n∏
i=1
Hi =
(
L2(0, S;L2(K))
)n
,
(4.1)
and the (resolvent) operators Li ∈ L
(Hi, L2(K)) defined as (see Section 2) Lihi = vi(S), where vi(S)
is vi(y, s;hi), evaluated at s = S, is the unique solution of the problem:∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂vi
∂s
+ Lvi +Avi +B . ∇vi − N
2
vi = hiχO′
i
in RN × (0, S)
vi(0) = 0 in R
N .
(4.2)
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Note that vi belongs to C
(
[0, S];H1(K)
)
, with
|vi|C([0,S];H1(K)) ≤ Ci(T )|vi|Hi , (4.3)
and Lihi = vi(S) is linear, for each i, justifying that Li belongs in L
(Hi, H1(K)) or in L (Hi, L2(K)).
Remember that in the definition of Ji, given in (2.7), the argument v(y, s, g,h) is the unique
solution of the initial-boundary value problem (1.9) with right-hand side
g(y, s)χO′ +
n∑
i=1
hi(y, s)χO′
i
.
Therefore, for fixed g ∈ L2(0, S;L2(K)) we obtain z ∈ C ([0, S];L2(K)), as the unique solution of
the initial-boundary value problem∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂z
∂s
+ Lz +Az +B . ∇z − N
2
z = g(y, s)χO′ in R
N × (0, S),
z(x, 0) = 0 in RN .
(4.4)
Thus, from (4.2) and (4.4) it follows that
n∑
i=1
vi+z is also a solution of (1.9). From the uniqueness
of the solution v(y, s, g,h) of (1.9) we can write
v(y, s, g,h) = z(y, s, g) +
n∑
i=1
vi(y, s,h) = Q0(s)g +
n∑
i=1
Qi(s)hi, 0 ≤ s ≤ S.
In the last identity above we have used the notation of Remark 2.2. Besides, from the continuity
it can be evaluated at s = S, which gives
v(y, S, g,h) = z(y, S, g) +
n∑
i=1
vi(y, S,h) = z
S(y) +
n∑
i=1
Lihi(y, S) = L0g +
n∑
i=1
Lihi. (4.5)
Again, in the last identity above we have used the notation of Remark 2.2. From (4.5), we modify
the Ji obtaining
Ji(g, h1, . . . , hi, . . . , hn)
=
1
2
∫ S
0
∫
O′
i
|Dy,s| h2i K(y) dyds+
αi
2
∫
RN
|Dy| ρ2i (y)
(
n∑
i=1
Lihi − ηS(y)
)2
K(y) dy
=
1
2
∣∣∣|Dy,s| 12hi∣∣∣2
Hi
+
αi
2
∣∣∣∣∣|Dy| 12 ρi
(
n∑
i=1
Lihi − ηS(y)
)∣∣∣∣∣
2
L2(K)
,
(4.6)
with ηS(y) = vS(y)− zS(y).
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It is easy to see that, for each i, the functional Ji is convex and lower semi-continuous. Therefore,
h = (h1, ..., hn) ∈ H is the Nash equilibrium for the functionals Ji if, and only if, its Gateaux derivative
is zero, that is,
(
|Dy,s|hi, ĥi
)
Hi
+ αi
ρi|Dy|
 n∑
j=1
Ljhj − ηS
 , ρiLiĥi

L2(K)
= 0, (4.7)
for all ĥi ∈ L2(0, S;L2(K)).
As the adjoint L∗i of Li belongs to L
(
L2(K),Hi
)
, then from (4.7) one gets
|Dy,s| hi + αiL∗i
ρ2i (y)|Dy| n∑
j=1
Ljhj
 = αiL∗i (ρ2i (y)|Dy|ηS) , i = 1, ..., n. (4.8)
Next, we change the notation to obtain a better formulation of linear system (4.8). In fact, setting
ξ = (ξ1, ..., ξn), with ξi = αiL
∗
i
(
ρ2i (y)|Dy|ηS
)
,
and considering an operator L ∈ L(H,H) defined by Lh with the n components
(Lh)i = |Dy,s| hi + αiL∗i
ρ2i (y)|Dy| n∑
j=1
Ljhj
 ,
then the system (4.8) is rewritten
Lh = ξ in H. (4.9)
Thus, we must prove that the linear equation (4.9) has a solution h = (h1, ..., hn) in H for each
ξ = (ξ1, ..., ξn) in H. The solvability of (4.9) will be established as application of the Lax-Milgram
Lemma, with restrictions on αi and ρi .
Theorem 4.1. Assume that
αi |Dy| |ρi|∞ is small enough, for any i = 1, ..., n. (4.10)
Then L is an invertible operator. It means, there exists a Nash equilibrium h = (h1, ..., hn) for Ji.
Proof. In the case n = 1 we have H = H1, h = h1 and therefore
(Lh,h)H =
(|Dy,s| h1 + α1L∗1 (ρ21(y)|Dy|L1h1) , h1)H1
=
∣∣∣ |Dy,s| 12 h1∣∣∣2
H1
+ α1
∣∣∣ρ1(y) |Dy| 12L1h1∣∣∣2
L2(K)
≥ k1|h1|2H1 ,
(4.11)
where we have used above the inequality (2.8). Then L is coercive and by the Lax-Milgram Lemma,
the equation Lh = ξ in H, has a solution h.
16 Controllability of Stackelberg-Nash Strategies for Linear Heat 2008
Now, suppose n > 1. Again if we use (2.8) and the fact that Li ∈ L
(Hi, L2(K)), one has
(Lh,h)H =
n∑
i=1
(|Dy,s| hi, hi)Hi +
n∑
i=1
(αiρi |Dy|Lihi, ρi Lihi)L2(K)
≥
n∑
i=1
k1|hi|2Hi +
n∑
i=1
(αiρi |Dy|Lihi, ρi Lihi)L2(K) .
(4.12)
Next, it will be analyzed the second term on the right-hand side of (4.12). In fact, taking the
absolute value one gets∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
(αiρi |Dy|Lihi, ρi Lihi)L2(K)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ α k4 ρ
n∑
i,j=1
|Ljhj |L2(K) |Lihi|L2(K)
≤ α k4 ρ
( n∑
i=1
|Lihi|2L2(K)
) 1
2
(n)
1
2
2 ≤ α k4 ρ n C2S n∑
i=1
|hi|2Hi ,
(4.13)
where k4 is defined in (2.8), α = max{α1, ..., αn}, CS = max{Ci(S)}, with Ci(S) defined in (4.3) and
ρ = max{ρ1, ..., ρn}. As for hypothesis αi |Dy| |ρi|∞ is small enough, we assume
α k4 ρ n C
2
S ≤
k1
2
. (4.14)
Substituting (4.14), into (4.13) and using (4.12) we finally obtain
(Lh,h)H ≥
k1
2
|h|2H. (4.15)
Thus (4.11) and (4.15) say that Lax-Milgram Lemma is applicable and there exists only one h
solution of Lh = ξ in H for all i = 1, ..., n.
5 Appendix: Existence, uniqueness and regularity of the state
In this Appendix, we recall a theoretical result for the linear system∣∣∣∣∣∣ vs + Lv + A(y, s)v +B(y, s).∇v −
N
2
v = ϕ(y, s) in RN × (0, S),
v(y, 0) = v0(y) in R
N ,
(5.1)
where A(y, s) ∈ L∞(RN × (0, S)), B(y, s) ∈ (L∞(RN × (0, S)))N .
We have the following:
Theorem 5.1. Given ϕ ∈ L2(0, S;L2(K)) and v0 ∈ L2(K), there exists a unique solution v in
the space W
(
0, S,H1(K), H−1(K)
)
of the problem (5.1). Moreover, if v0 ∈ H1(K), then v ∈
W
(
0, S,H2(K), L2(K)
)
.
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Sketch of the proof: We will employ Galerkin method. In fact, let (wi)i∈N be a Hilbertian
basis of H1(K). Represent by Vm the subspace generated by {w1, ..., wn} and let us consider the
finite-dimensional problem
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Find vm ∈ Vm solution of
(v′m, z) + (Lvm, z) + (Avm, z) + (B.∇vm, z)−
N
2
(vm, z) = (ϕ, z) for all zm ∈ Vm
vm(0) = v0m → v0 strongly in L2(K)
(5.2)
To obtain the first a priori estimate, we take z = vm in (5.2). We obtain:
1
2
d
ds
|vm(s)|2L2(K) + |vm(s)|2H1(K)
≤ A0|vm(s)|2L2(K) +B0|vm(s)|H1(K)|vm(s)|L2(K) + |ϕ(s)|L2(K)|vm(s)|L2(K),
(5.3)
where A0 = |A|L∞(RN×(0,S)), and B0 = |B|(L∞(RN×(0,S)))N .
Hence by integration from 0 to s ≤ S, in the local interval of existence of vm(s), and using Youngs
inequalities and, again, the Gronwalls inequality yields
|vm(s)|L2(K) ≤ C and
∫ S
0
|vm(s)|2H1(K)ds ≤ C, (5.4)
after the extension of vm(s) to [0, S].
With the estimates (5.4) we take the limit in (5.2) obtaining a function v inW
(
0, S,H1(K), H−1(K)
)
which is weak solution of (5.1). We also have uniqueness.
We furthermore suppose that v0 ∈ H1(K). In the approximate system (5.2) we suppose v0m → v0
strongly in H1(K). Then we can obtain a second a priori estimate. We take z = v′m(t) in (5.2). We
obtain:
|v′m(s)|2L2(K) +
1
2
d
ds
|vm(s)|2H1(K) ≤ A0C0|vm(s)|H1(K) |v′m(s)|L2(K)
+B0|vm(s)|H1(K) |v′m(s)|L2(K) + |ϕ(s)|L2(K) |v′m(s)|L2(K),
where we have used the Poincare´ inequality, i.e., |vm(s)|L2(K) ≤ C0|vm(s)|H1(K) (see (2.5)2).
Thus,
1
4
|v′m(s)|2L2(K) +
d
ds
|vm(s)|2H1(K) ≤ 2|ϕ(s)|2L2(K) + 2(A20C20 +B20)|vm(s)|2H1(K).
By Gronwall’s lemma we obtain:∫ S
0
|v′m(s)|L2(K)ds ≤ C and |vm(s)|H1(K) ≤ C, on 0 ≤ s ≤ S. (5.5)
We obtain a strong solution by the process of regularity of an elliptic equation. We obtain a strong
solution v ∈W (0, S,H2(K), L2(K)) ⊂ C([0, T ], H1(K)), by (2.6).
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
Next, we give a precise definition of (3.1) in the sense of transposition and prove an existence and
uniqueness result. The main question we are concerned here consists in finding a solution p of the of
the parabolic problem:∣∣∣∣∣∣ −ps + Lp+Ap− div(Bp)−
N
2
p− 1
2
y . Bp = 0 in RN × (0, S),
p(y, S) = ξ in RN .
(5.6)
when ξ ∈ H−1(K). A function p ∈ L2(0, S;L2(K)) is called an solution of (5.6) obtained by transpo-
sition if ∫ S
0
∫
RN
p(y, s)ϕ(y, s)K(y) dyds = 〈ξ, v(S)〉
for any solution v of the problem (5.1) with ϕ ∈ L2(0, S;L2(K)) and v0(y) = 0 in RN . We represent
by 〈 , 〉 the duality pairing between H−1(K) and H1(K). We have
Theorem 5.2. If ξ ∈ H−1(K), A(y, s) ∈ L∞(RN × (0, S)), B(y, s) ∈ (L∞(RN × (0, S)))N then there
exists an unique solution p ∈ L2(0, S;L2(K)) ∩ C ([0, S];H−1(K)) of problem (5.6).
Proof. Let us consider the linear form F : L2(0, S;L2(K))→ R defined by
F (ϕ) = 〈ξ, v(S)〉, (5.7)
for all ϕ ∈ L2(0, S;L2(K)), where v is the solution of (5.1), with v0 = 0, corresponding to ϕ.
Since v0 = 0, it is easy see that
|v(S)|H1(K) ≤ C|ϕ|L2(0,S;L2(K)). (5.8)
Thus, F is a continuous linear form in L2(0, S;L2(K)). By Riesz’s representation theorem, there
exists a unique p ∈ L2(0, S;L2(K)) such that
F (ϕ) =
∫ S
0
∫
RN
p ϕ K dyds, for all ϕ ∈ L2(0, S;L2(K)). (5.9)
The uniqueness is consequence of the Du Bois Raymond Lemma. Moreover,
|F |L2(0,S;L2(K)) = |p|L2(0,S;L2(K)). (5.10)
Now, due to (5.7), (5.8) and (5.10), for some constant C, we have
|p|L2(0,S;L2(K)) ≤ C |ξ|H−1(K). (5.11)
Since ξ ∈ H−1(K), there exists (ξm)m∈N with ξm ∈ L2(K) for all m, such that
ξm → ξ strongly in H−1(K). (5.12)
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Let (pm) be the sequence of solutions of (5.6) corresponding to ξm for each m. Obviously, the
function pn − pm is the solution, by transposition, of (5.6) corresponding to ξn − ξm.
From (5.11) and (5.12) we have that (pm)m∈N is a Cauchy sequence in L
2(0, S;L2(K)) and
pm → p strongly in L2(0, S, L2(K)). (5.13)
On the other hand,
|〈p′m − p′n, ψ〉| ≤ |〈pm − pn, Lψ〉|+ |〈A(pm − pn), ψ〉|
+ |〈pm − pn, B . ∇ψ〉|+ N
2
|〈pm − pn, ψ〉|
≤ C|pm − pn|L2(0,S,L2(K)) |ψ|L2(0,S,H2(K)) ,
for all ψ ∈ L2(0, S;H2(K)), and this implies that (p′m)m∈N is a Cauchy sequence in L2(0, S;H−2(K)).
Therefore, we have
pm → p strongly in W (0, S, L2(K), H−2(K)), (5.14)
and this space is continuous embedded in C([0, S], H−1(K)).
We obtain pm → p strongly in C([0, S], H−1(K)). In particular, p ∈ C([0, S], H−1(K)). This
completes the proof of Theorem 5.2.
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